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Abstract
Eva Erman and Niklas Mo¨ller have recently criticised a range of political theorists for
committing a pragmatistic fallacy, illicitly drawing normative conclusions from politically
neutral ideas about language. This paper examines their critique with respect to one of
their primary targets: the pragmatist approach to political legitimacy that I proposed in
earlier work, which draws on Robert Brandom’s theory of language. I argue that the
charge relies on a misrepresentation of the role of pragmatist ideas about language in
my analysis of legitimacy. Pragmatism’s significance for thinking about political legitimacy
does not lie in the normative conclusions it justifies but in the way it reorients our
thinking towards political practice. This raises the deeper question of what we are to
expect from a theory of legitimacy. I argue that Erman and Mo¨ller presuppose a widely
held but unduly restrictive conception of what a normative theory of legitimacy consists
in and that pragmatism can broaden the scope of enquiry: a theory of legitimacy should
not focus narrowly on the content and justification of criteria, but more fundamentally
aim to explicate the forms of political activity in which such criteria are at stake.
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Introduction
What is the signiﬁcance of pragmatist philosophy of language for political theory?
Pragmatists such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and, more recently, Robert Brandom
hold that meaning ought to be understood in terms of use. Political theorists
who ﬁnd mainstream approaches overly abstract have used pragmatist ideas, like
Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, as a resource for more practice-oriented
theorising. However, Eva Erman and Niklas Mo¨ller have recently argued, in this
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journal and elsewhere, that these political theorists have seriously overestimated
the mileage one can get out of pragmatist theories of language for political theory
(Erman and Mo¨ller, 2014, 2015b). They argue that a number of theorists – in
particular Chantal Mouﬀe, Aletta Norval, James Tully, and myself – commit the
same mistake: they illicitly derive normative political conclusions from observa-
tions about the nature of language. If Erman and Mo¨ller are correct, we should
conclude that the pragmatic turn in political theory leads into a blind alley.1
My aim is to assess the cogency of this critique, and thereby to reappraise the
signiﬁcance of a certain variety of pragmatism for political theory. I begin by
explaining the ﬂaw that Erman and Mo¨ller attribute to pragmatist political
theory, which I’ll label the ‘pragmatistic fallacy’. I then argue that the attribution
of this ﬂaw rests on a misrepresentation of the role that a pragmatist theory of
language plays in a prime target of their critique: my own approach to political
legitimacy (Fossen, 2013), which builds on the work of Robert Brandom.
Pragmatism’s signiﬁcance for thinking about political legitimacy does not lie in
the normative conclusions it justiﬁes but in the way it reorients our thinking
towards political practice. This shift in orientation does not refute standard the-
ories of political legitimacy, as such, but it renders problematic their narrow focus
on criteria of legitimacy, in abstraction from the forms of political practice in which
such criteria are at stake. The deeper question this raises is: what are we to expect
from a theory of legitimacy? I argue that Erman and Mo¨ller presuppose an overly
narrow view of what ‘normative political theory’ consists in – a picture that is
commonplace, but that pragmatism calls into question. Their critique is thus fun-
damentally question-begging. I conclude that Erman and Mo¨ller’s scepticism about
pragmatism’s signiﬁcance for political theory is unwarranted, and that pragmatism
oﬀers a promising, if as yet unfulﬁlled, avenue for pursuing a more practice-
oriented approach to political theory.2
Throughout I shall focus in particular on Brandom’s pragmatism and its sig-
niﬁcance for theorising political legitimacy. Against this, Erman and Mo¨ller have
developed the most elaborate version of their argument. Of course, I have a par-
ticular interest in coming to terms with a critique of my own proposal. But this
focus also enables us to sidestep contentious exegetical questions about
Wittgenstein, which have been much discussed. And if a primary target of
Erman and Mo¨ller’s critique can be successfully defended, that should suﬃce to
defuse their general scepticism, although of course that is not to say that all appro-
priations of pragmatism are unproblematic.
The pragmatistic fallacy
Let me begin by presenting the general form of the critique. Erman and Mo¨ller
do not contest the plausibility of pragmatism about language as such, but only
its relevance to political theory. Their critique turns on attributing to political
theorists what I shall call the ‘pragmatistic fallacy’, although they do not use
the phrase themselves. As they put it, there is a ‘‘‘gap’’ between pragmatically
inﬂuenced theories of language and meaning and normative political theory’
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(Erman and Mo¨ller, 2015b: 122). By exposing this gap in the arguments of political
theorists, Erman and Mo¨ller (2015b) intend to demonstrate that ‘pragmatically
inﬂuenced theories of language and meaning, however full of insight, cannot be
put to substantial normative use in political theory’ (p. 122). Although the details
of their theories diﬀer, a broad range of theorists all commit the same sort of mis-
take, on Erman and Mo¨ller’s reading: they derive normative political conclusions
from non-normative or apolitical premises about language. This cannot work,
because the pragmatist ideas on which these theorists draw are about language
and ‘as such neutral as to which normative political theory has the best arguments
in its favour’ (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2015b: 136).
At ﬁrst sight, this critique seems plausible enough. Even if one holds, as prag-
matists typically do, that meaning is normative (words can be used appropriately
and inappropriately), and that therefore a theory of language does not describe a
non-normative domain of empirical facts, it is still plausible that conceptual norms
lie at a diﬀerent level of analysis than ethical and political norms. The former do
not justify the latter, at least not without a rather elaborate argument, presumably
involving non-linguistic premises. The target of Erman and Mo¨ller’s critique is thus
analogous to the naturalistic fallacy: the attempt, without further ado, to derive
‘ought’ from ‘is’.
I agree that an inference from mere claims about the meaning of words or the
nature of language to a normative political position would be spurious, just as an
inference from supposedly neutral facts would be. But do pragmatist political the-
orists indeed make such a mistake? Erman and Mo¨ller provide the most detailed
version of this argument in their critique of my use of Brandom for conceptualising
political legitimacy. Let us see how this fallacy allegedly shows up there.
In a paper that became a prime exhibit for Erman and Mo¨ller’s critique,
I proposed that on the assumption of a pragmatist theory of meaning, one can
explain what political legitimacy is in terms of an account of what it is to take
or treat something as legitimate in political practice, rather than by positing a
deﬁnition of political legitimacy as, say, a moral right to rule (Fossen, 2013).
When we call authorities legitimate, we do not represent them as having a certain
moral property. Rather, we express a political stance towards those authorities
(and towards others subjected to them). This expressive account of ‘legitimacy’
enables us to oﬀer a performative interpretation of the nature of political legitim-
acy. For an authority to be legitimate (from some perspective) is just for it to be
appropriate (from that perspective) for subjects to take a particular stance towards
it, i.e. to take or treat it in certain ways. The concept of legitimacy can thus be
understood in terms of its practical role as making one’s stance explicit, in dispute
with others. Accounting for the concept of legitimacy in this way, I argued, enables
us to frame ‘political judgment as a situated practical activity, drawing attention to
the conditions in which this appears as a lived, practical predicament’ (Fossen,
2013: 442). It reorients theories of legitimacy from an exclusive concern with the
content and justiﬁcation of criteria of legitimacy towards the task of making expli-
cit how the question of legitimacy presents itself and engages us in practice.
I tentatively suggested that this could draw our attention to the ways in which
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political activities, like representing power, articulating identity, and narrating
events, aﬀect judgements and criteria of legitimacy (Fossen, 2013: 441–450).
Erman and Mo¨ller argue that it is a mistake to think that Brandom’s work can
be used for these purposes. The ideas that I appropriate from Brandom, notably his
explanation of discursive practice in terms of deontic scorekeeping, are ‘fully gen-
eral aspects’ of language (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2014: 489). And because Brandom’s
theory is general in this way, we cannot derive substantial normative conclusions
about legitimacy from it: ‘the aspects of Brandom’s philosophy of language that
Fossen utilises are perfectly general, and will not lend themselves to any practical-
normative conclusions’ (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2015b: 135). Nor does Brandom’s
theory of language support any interesting second-order conclusions about how
to theorise legitimacy: it fails to justify any ‘meta-normative constraints’, as
they put it, on ‘substantive’ normative theories of legitimacy. They take it, on
these grounds, that they have ‘invalidate[d] Fossen’s inference from Brandom’s
theory to meta-normative constraints on theories of legitimacy’ (Erman and
Mo¨ller, 2014: 494).
Clearly, then, the fundamental problem that Erman and Mo¨ller see in my
account is an instance of the pragmatistic fallacy. I grant that such an inference
would be problematic. So the question is: does my approach indeed fall into this
trap? And if not, why would one think that it does?
How pragmatism makes a difference
The pragmatistic fallacy is a serious problem if you want to derive political norms
from ideas about language. But some of the political theorists who appeal to
Wittgensteinian ideas about language do so not in order to justify an alternative
set of norms, but to open up conceptual room for a diﬀerent way of looking at a
problem. For them, the point of appealing to language isn’t to justify ‘practical-
normative conclusions’, nor to impose ‘meta-normative constraints’, but to lift a
certain kind of constraint – to free us from captivity by a picture, as Wittgenstein
famously put it (Norval, 2007; Owen, 2003; Tully, 2003). At issue in the case we are
considering here is a picture of the question of legitimacy and of the appropriate
theoretical response to that question.
To appreciate how this undercuts Erman and Mo¨ller’s critique, let us examine
their key point: that we cannot derive any speciﬁc conclusions about political
legitimacy from a general theory of meaning. It is true that Brandom oﬀered a
general theory of meaning. His masterpiece Making it Explicit presents an account
of what we do when we talk to each other: it seeks to ‘mak[e] explicit the implicit
structure characteristic of discursive practice as such’ (Brandom, 1994: 649). This is
basically a systematic articulation of the Wittgensteinian idea that meaning should
be understood in terms of use. Erman and Mo¨ller point out that this is a thought
about conceptual content as such. Therefore, insofar as methodological or substan-
tive conclusions can be drawn from it for other ﬁelds of study, such implications
count equally across the board. For example, Brandom’s insight that claims are
inherently contestable and perspectival holds for any claim. This leads Erman and
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Mo¨ller (2014) to conclude: ‘Consequently, Brandom’s account does not justify any
particular constraints on political theory [. . .] any more than it does on
mathematical theory’ (p. 489).
This is correct, as far as it goes. But this observation does not undermine a
Brandomian approach to political legitimacy. For starters, insofar as the implica-
tions of pragmatism apply to other areas of study as well, that does not prevent us
from exploring their signiﬁcance for particular ﬁelds. I suppose it would be quite
interesting to reﬂect on the signiﬁcance of Brandom’s perspectivism for the
philosophy of mathematics (cf. Pitkin, 1972: 236–240). More to the point, it is
misleading to suggest, as Erman and Mo¨ller do, that because the theory of
meaning is general in this way, concepts that are elucidated with the help of
it are interchangeable. Erman and Mo¨ller (2014) claim that my analysis of
legitimacy ‘applies to all concepts, and fails to distinguish political legitimacy
from any other concept, political or otherwise’ (p. 489). But while concepts in
general are meaningful in virtue of their role in social practice, Erman and
Mo¨ller would acknowledge, of course, that not all concepts have the same
role. For example, descriptive terms (e.g. H2O, mammal) enable us to pick
out certain things in the world and to represent them in one way or another.
Logical vocabulary (e.g. conditionals), in contrast, has the role of articulating
what follows from what, making explicit inferential commitments that are other-
wise implicit in our reasoning. And normative terms do not purport to represent
the world, but to articulate features of our practices: what it is appropriate or
inappropriate to do in certain circumstances.3
The general implication is that for any concept employed in a certain practice,
its meaning should be explained in terms of its functional role in that practice.
Brandom’s theoretical framework thus yields a methodological strategy for eluci-
dating concepts. Diﬀerent concepts are to be accounted for in terms of their speciﬁc
role in the kind of practice in which they belong. Mark Lance and Heath White
(2007) refer to this as a ‘stance approach’, in contrast to a ‘metaphysical approach’.
A stance approach explains what something is in terms of what it is to appropri-
ately take or treat it as such, not by specifying necessary and suﬃcient conditions
independent of an account of a participant’s relation to that thing.4 Such an
approach has been deployed to develop accounts of personhood, autonomy, and
knowledge, for example (Anderson, 2008; Brandom, 1995; Lance and White, 2007).
How much mileage one can get out of this strategy varies. In the case of descrip-
tive vocabulary, because its role is to represent things in the world, concepts are
answerable to how things are in the world. The physical properties of H2O con-
strain when it is appropriate to call something water. To say that for something to
be water is for it to be appropriate to believe that it is water is not very inform-
ative.5 The strategy becomes much more interesting where practice-dependent phe-
nomena are concerned, because then it becomes possible to move from claims
about meaning to claims about the phenomenon itself. Joel Anderson’s analysis
of autonomy is a case in point. For someone to be autonomous, on his account, is
for it to be appropriate to take and treat him or her in certain ways rather than
others. Here ‘the analysis of the concept makes essential reference to a way in
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which individuals engage with each other from a second-personal standpoint’
(Anderson, 2008: 18).
There is no reason why such an explanatory strategy could not be fruitfully
employed to explicate political concepts. To do so, it is crucial not just to pick
up on the general idea about the practice dependence of meaning, but also to
attend to the form of the practice in question. In line with this, I tried to develop
an account of the speciﬁc role of the concept of legitimacy within a certain form of
practice: the encounter between political subject and authority. A key claim here is
that ‘legitimacy’ is not a representational concept. Rather, its role is to express
one’s political stance towards the authorities (and others subjected to them).6 It is
important to clarify this. In a trivial sense, on Brandom’s account, assertions nor-
mally express beliefs (doxastic commitments) on the part of the speaker. The idea
here is rather that legitimacy claims express complex patterns of practical commit-
ments and entitlements. In calling an authority legitimate, one attributes an entitle-
ment to rule to that authority, while also undertaking a commitment to treat it in
ways appropriate to its status (say, as a source of reasons), and attributing such
commitments to other subjects. In this way, I argued, one can explain what it is to
be legitimate in terms of taking something as legitimate. Legitimacy on this account
is what Brandom calls a ‘complex hybrid normative status’, like knowledge. When
I take you to know that X is the case, I attribute to you a commitment and an
entitlement to holding that X; but I also acknowledge a commitment to X on my
own part (Brandom, 1994: 201–204, 1995: 906). Similarly, legitimacy is complex in
that it involves two distinct kinds of status (entitlement to rule; commitment to
obey), and hybrid in that it must be understood with reference to multiple practical
perspectives at once (subject, authority, and other subjects). That is why, as I
argued elsewhere (Fossen, 2014b), the concepts of political legitimacy and political
obligation refer to the same practical predicament. In short, the notion of a pol-
itical stance is much more complex than the notion of a doxastic commitment.
In the original paper, I did not make the diﬀerence between the notion of a
political stance and just any assertion suﬃciently explicit. Even so, Erman and
Mo¨ller ignore all the speciﬁcs of the analysis of legitimacy when they claim of it
that ‘we may replace ‘‘legitimacy’’ not only with any political term but with any
term at all’ (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2014: 492). Far from it. The strategy of explaining
what it is to be X in terms of what it is to appropriately take something as X only
works for practice-dependent phenomena such as normative statuses. Moreover,
that strategy is pursued here with an eye to a particular type of practice. The notion
of a political stance is explained with reference to practical contexts with a speciﬁc
structure: the encounter between subjects and an authority that purports to rule.
Brandom oﬀers a compelling framework for motivating and explaining a stance
approach to political legitimacy. His theory does not settle the content of such an
account. Only when it is supplemented with an interpretation of political practice
can we draw interesting conclusions. In the paper, I tried to draw theoretical atten-
tion to the distinctive dimensions of political contestation in which legitimacy is at
stake – representing power, articulating identities, and narrating events
(Fossen, 2013: 441–450). Admittedly, this is merely a gesture in the direction of
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a more comprehensive explication of practices of judging legitimacy. What sub-
stantive implications such an account would have remains to be seen.
The upshot, for now, is that pragmatism’s signiﬁcance lies in the way it draws
our theoretical attention towards political practice. It is simply a distortion to
characterise the project as an ‘attempt to turn Brandom’s philosophy of mind
and language into normative political theory’ (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2015b: 136).
Nor is the key idea that Brandom’s theory on its own entails ‘meta-normative
constraints’ on political theories, except the very general constraint that theory
ought to do justice to practice. But if the content and justiﬁcation of criteria of
legitimacy is bound up with ongoing practice – a point not disputed by Erman and
Mo¨ller – then political practice may place such constraints. Clearly such a conclu-
sion cannot be derived from a theory of language alone. But what pragmatism
about language does suggest is that the purview of a theory of political legitimacy is
often construed too narrowly. Theories of legitimacy are usually taken to consist in
the articulation and justiﬁcation of criteria of legitimacy – what Erman and Mo¨ller
refer to as a ‘substantial’ normative theory. Typically, theorists proceed as if one
can settle the content and justiﬁcation of such criteria in abstraction from the forms
of practice through which legitimacy is politically contested – just as certain the-
orists of language consider meaning (semantics) in abstraction from use (prag-
matics). From a pragmatist perspective, that is a problematic form of abstraction
because it fails to do justice to the ways in which concepts and criteria are bound up
with practice. So the diﬀerence a pragmatist approach makes here is that it prob-
lematises the failure to attend to politics – a lack of realism, if you will. Engaging in a
political struggle for legitimacy is not the same thing as engaging in a philosophical
debate. Without denying that the explicit giving and asking for reasons will be part
of the story, what is needed is a much more systematic inquiry into the forms of
political activity that enable subjects to judge the legitimacy of a regime.7
Who put the ‘normative’ in ‘normative political theory’?
Even aside from their concern about the pragmatistic fallacy, which the previous
section aimed to defuse, Erman and Mo¨ller are generally sceptical that a pragmatic
turn in political theory could yield signiﬁcant results. For them, pragmatism means
‘business as usual’: ‘unless something more is added to the equation [. . .] nothing in
normative political theory is in fact changed by the socio-pragmatist viewpoint’
(Erman and Mo¨ller, 2014: 494). I grant that more work is needed to develop a
distinctively pragmatist approach to legitimacy and little can be achieved to that
eﬀect within the limited scope of this short methodological contribution. But it is
worth considering more closely how Erman and Mo¨ller frame the problem,
because, as I’ll try to show, their scepticism results from an overly narrow concep-
tion of normative political theory – a conception that seems all too prevalent in
current debates – rather than from pragmatism’s supposed lack of critical
potential.
Erman and Mo¨ller (2014) suggest that a stance approach to political legitimacy
does nothing more than ‘explain what all theorists, normativists and others, already
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do when they learn, use, and enhance their understanding of legitimacy’ (p. 490).
I explained above how a stance approach shifts our theoretical attention from an
exclusive concern with criteria to the task of explicating the forms of political
activity in which such criteria are at stake. That is a signiﬁcant shift in orientation,
because philosophical theories of legitimacy do not typically construe the latter as
part of their core business; they regard it as an empirical, not a normative issue.
In the same vein, Erman and Mo¨ller do not seem to register the proposed shift as
normatively signiﬁcant, even potentially. But why not?
The key point, as I see it, is that Erman and Mo¨ller presuppose the very task
description of a theory of legitimacy that a pragmatist approach calls into question.
The decisive question, in their view, is: ‘Does Fossen’s account lead to new nor-
mative theories?’ (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2014: 494). But the underlying issue is: what
does a normative theory of legitimacy consist in, to begin with? Erman and Mo¨ller
presuppose the traditional view of a theory of legitimacy as articulating standards
of legitimacy. But the point of reframing the question of legitimacy was precisely to
challenge the purported self-evidence of that picture. Erman and Mo¨ller’s critique
thus begs the fundamental question.
Let me approach this point from a slightly diﬀerent angle. As we have seen,
Erman and Mo¨ller question the signiﬁcance of theories of language for normative
political theory. But it is far from clear what the adjective ‘normative’ is supposed
to contribute in the locution ‘normative political theory’. Is it supposed to empha-
sise a general feature of political theory, namely its normativity? (For isn’t all
political theory normative in some sense?) Or is it to mark a contrast with an
alternative, non-normative kind of political theory? Erman and Mo¨ller appear to
subscribe to the latter view. When they insist that ‘[t]he task of the normative
political theorist, however, is to give an account of when authority is legitimate’,
their point is to contrast this with my merely ‘descriptive’ account of the concept of
legitimacy (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2014: 497). This in turn fuels their charge that I
conﬂate the distinction between ‘semantic’ and ‘substantially normative’ theories,
or:
the diﬀerence between accounts directed at characterising what is needed for us to
rightly interpret the speaker as talking about a speciﬁc concept (descriptive accounts)
and accounts that take concept grasping for granted and within the (often rather
approximate) semantic limits of the concept aims to characterise when we make
true rather than false claims with that concept (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2014: 494).
As they explain:
the aim of a normative account is not to specify the conditions under which we are
right to interpret a theorist as speaking about X. On the contrary, the theorist who
puts forward a normative account is assuming that the reader is already a competent
user of the concept or term in question. The normative theorist is instead presenting
an account of when the competent concept-wielder says true rather than false things.
If she puts forward a theory of justice or a theory of political legitimacy, she would not
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claim that a person who is not using the corresponding term in accordance with her
theory is making a semantic mistake as much as a substantive one. (Erman and
Mo¨ller, 2014: 491)
These passages, considered carefully, reveal the constrained conception of nor-
mative political theory with which Erman and Mo¨ller operate. The problem is not
that one cannot, in principle, distinguish between semantic or descriptive claims on
the one hand, and substantive or normative ones on the other. Pragmatists typic-
ally question a rigid separation of facts and norms, and of empirical and normative
enquiry. But Erman and Mo¨ller’s point does not require positing a domain of
purely neutral facts. And we must grant that there are diﬀerent questions one
might ask. Whether someone grasps a concept to begin with, and whether one
or another particular application of that concept is correct, these are not the
same question (although they are not fundamentally diﬀerent questions either, if
mastering a concept is being able to use it appropriately).
The problem concerns the particular way in which Erman and Mo¨ller employ
the distinction between normative and non-normative theoretical claims. The cru-
cial point to note is what their demarcation of normative theory asks us to treat as
given. In the passages just quoted, normative theory is deﬁned by Erman and
Mo¨ller as ‘tak[ing] concept-grasping for granted’. Most telling in this regard is
the suggestion that ‘all relevant political theorists are supposedly competent
users of the concept of legitimacy’ (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2014: 493). Are we? Can
we simply take that for granted? And how can we know that, absent a sustained
inquiry into the nature of the political practices in which legitimacy is at stake?8
We (political theorists) often presume that we know what we are talking about
when we speak of legitimacy, justice, and the like, and that we know what we are
doing in talking about them. But the task of the political theorist is surely also to
question such taken-for-granted notions and to ask whether the ways in which we
theorise them do justice to the phenomena in question. Yet, if ‘normative political
theory’ is taken to be concerned with substantive arguments that take our concepts
for granted, and not with mere description or semantics, such questions necessarily
fail to appear on its horizon.
To be sure, Erman and Mo¨ller’s view allows that, in addition to the distinct-
ive task of normative political theory, there are other tasks for political theory,
broadly conceived, such as conceptual analysis, genealogy, or pragmatic expli-
cation. But their division of labour makes it seem as though ‘normative theory’
constitutes a self-standing domain of reﬂection, insulated from such other,
supposedly non-normative lines of inquiry. Yet what we should consider sub-
stantially normative, as supposed to merely semantic or descriptive, is itself a
normative question that should fall within the purview of (normative) political
theory (cf. Brandom, 1994: 625). This means that we cannot by deﬁnitional ﬁat
separate apparently semantic concerns – the meaning of ‘legitimacy’, or ‘justice’,
‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ – from substantially normative questions. Let us there-
fore refrain from compartmentalising these tasks and return to the denominator
‘political theory’ simpliciter.
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This more encompassing and reﬂexive view of political theory ﬁts well with the
spirit of Brandom’s project. According to Erman and Mo¨ller, the signiﬁcance of
Brandom for political theory is neither here nor there:
[T]his Brandomian story, while being seminal in the sense of oﬀering a new way of
understanding what we do (i.e. how meaning is conferred through practice), is not
telling us to do anything diﬀerently from what we already do. If Brandom is right, we
already, all of us, confer meaning through these score-keeping and stance-taking
practices. (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2015b: 135)
But in contrast to Erman and Mo¨ller’s domesticating reading of Brandom, his pro-
ject is fundamentally critical. Articulating a new way of understanding what we are
doing is not a matter of mere description. It never quite leaves things as they were,
but transforms what we are doing, enabling us to do it diﬀerently and better; to
identify certain moves as apt or inapt, and to say why. (I defend the critical potential
of Brandom’s pragmatism in more detail elsewhere (Fossen, 2014a).) As Brandom
(2009) contrasts his explicative project with the tradition of analytical philosophy:
[T]he most important diﬀerence is that where analysis of meanings is a fundamentally
conservative enterprise [...], I see the point of explicating concepts rather to be opening
them up to rational criticism. [...] Defective concepts distort our thought and constrain
us by limiting the propositions and plans we can entertain as candidates for endorse-
ment in belief and intention. (p. 114)
To be clear: I do not pretend to have carried out such a critique. That would
require developing a perspicuous representation of political practices of judging
legitimacy, analogous to that oﬀered by Brandom for discursive practices in gen-
eral. I have merely tried to open up conceptual room for such a project and to
render problematic a certain type of constraint on our thinking about political
legitimacy: the idea that a normative theory of legitimacy essentially consists in
criteria of judgement, and not in the explication of political practices. One of the
ways in which concepts can constrain us is by obscuring from view the full range of
activities we can see as relevant to a question at hand. Erman and Mo¨ller’s insist-
ence that a pragmatist perspective does not contribute anything ‘substantive’ to
‘normative political theory’ manifests precisely this constraint on our thinking
about legitimacy.
Conclusion
My question was whether Erman and Mo¨ller’s scepticism about the signiﬁcance of
pragmatist conceptions of language for political theory is justiﬁed. I conclude that
it is not. The pragmatistic fallacy, on which their argument hinges, is a serious
problem for theories that derive political norms from mere claims about language.
But I have shown that no such inference is made in a primary target of this cri-
tique: my pragmatist approach to political legitimacy. Furthermore, I demonstrated
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that Erman and Mo¨ller’s critique perpetuates an unduly restrictive conception of
what a normative theory of legitimacy consists in. The upshot of a pragmatist
approach to political legitimacy is not to impose ‘meta-normative constraints’ on
theories of legitimacy, but to lift a constraint. The task of a theory of political
legitimacy is not just to articulate criteria of legitimacy, but more fundamentally
to explicate the ways in which the question of legitimacy manifests itself in practice,
and the forms of activity through which we might engage it. It remains to be seen
what insights such a reorientation of theory towards political practice might yield.
But let us not dismiss the project without seriously trying to carry it through.
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Notes
1. Erman and Mo¨ller’s critique here concerns political theorists who draw on pragmatist
theories of language and is not meant to extend to uses of pragmatist epistemology in
democratic theory.
2. Pragmatism is part of a broader current of approaches seeking to reorient political theory
towards practice, including realism and the practice-dependence approach. See
Festenstein (2016) on pragmatism’s affinities with realism. Two things seem to me dis-
tinctive about a pragmatist approach to legitimacy. First, practice-dependent and realist
accounts of legitimacy (or justice) still focus primarily on criteria, while locating their
source internal to politics (Sangiovanni, 2008; Sleat, 2014). By pursuing an alternative
conception of judgement, a pragmatist approach can challenge the traditional task
description of political theory more radically. In this respect, there is perhaps a closer
affinity with phenomenology. Second, pragmatism avoids commitment to a dichotomy
between politics and morality that is difficult to maintain (Erman and Mo¨ller, 2015a;
Jubb and Rossi, 2015).
3. Brandom claims, more specifically, that normative concepts (e.g. ought) function to
explicate inferences governing the propriety of actions. But see White (2003).
4. A metaphysical approach ‘begins by asking what a person, or agent, or subject is, perhaps
by attempting to supply necessary and sufficient conditions’ (Lance and White, 2007: 2–4).
Strictly speaking, stance approaches need not refer to a theory of language, but Brandom’s
framework offers a compelling way to motivate and articulate such an approach.
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5. Therefore ‘interesting stance accounts will employ attitudes other than belief or things
other than attitudes, such as actions, practices, or institutional arrangements’ (Lance and
White, 2007: 2).
6. Because what is expressed is understood here in terms of normative attitudes (attributions
of commitments and entitlements), this account differs from meta-ethical expressivism,
where what is expressed are non-normative attitudes.
7. ‘In other words, we need to direct our attention to the task of making explicit the ways in
which [the question of legitimacy] engages us, and explore both the possibilities and limits
of political judgment’ (Fossen, 2013: 447). For a similar move, see Aletta Norval (2007:
3): ‘I hope to reorient democratic theory [. . .] by elucidating what we are doing and
committing ourselves to when we participate in democratic life together’. Or, as John
Gunnell puts the point (2012: 99): ‘[political philosophy’s] first task is not to talk about
justice in the abstract but to do justice to the subject matter in the sense of understanding
and clarifying the practices of justice’.
8. For Erman and Mo¨ller (2014: 493), the ‘fact that [the theorist] seems to be successfully
engaging’ in the practice of disputing legitimacy gives us ‘ample reason’ to assume that he
or she masters the concept, ‘until proven wrong’. That fact does not seem so evident to
me. I find much of the literature on political legitimacy mystifying and detached from
political reality. Either way, this is an unreasonable burden of proof. If we require proof
before calling these assumptions into question, our inquiry will never get off the ground.
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